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ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF LOWER 
FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 
Alfred S. Koneftky* 
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-1861. By Kermit L. 
Hall. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1980. Pp. xvii, 268. 
$19.50. 
FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 1789-
1816. By Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 1978. Pp. ix, 234. $16.50. 
Kermit Hall and Mary Tachau have written books that at first 
glance appear to complement one another in adding to our slim 
knowledge about lower federal courts and their judges in post-Revo-
lutionary and antebellum America. Each, however, has a di.ff erent 
historical approach. Tachau is thoroughly phenomenological and 
eschews most theoretical inquiry, while Hall confines his analysis 
within the parameters of antebellum political history. Both authors 
are sound historians, but neither quite knows what to do with his 
findings. Although Hall is better than Tachau in wrestling with the 
significance of the historical data, neither appreciates fully where the 
facts stand in relation to the big picture. Since I cannot convey in a 
short review what Tachau and Hall have mined in the way of histori-
cal detail, I will focus on only one problem that the books raised by 
implication: where the events presented could fit into the current 
debate over the historical role of the rule of law. 
Professor Tachau's book is built upon a formidable research 
base. She has examined the hitherto ignored 2,290 cases that came 
before the federal district court in Kentucky between its inception in 
1789 and the death of the original district judge, anti-Federalist 
Harry Innes, in 1816. Her general argument is relatively straightfor-
ward: Innes's court enjoyed a sound reputation within the poten-
tially hostile Kentucky community because it was accessible and 
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responsive, and eventually provided "the most visible" and stable 
"link" (p. 191) between the West and the federal government. To 
support her thesis, Tachau provides material on procedure, private 
civil suits, criminal cases, land disputes, and the enforcement of the 
internal revenue laws. Revenue cases accounted for about one third 
of the court's business during this period (pp. 6, 95). I would like to 
focus particularly on the attempt to impose and enforce the despised 
whiskey tax. 
Tachau sets the historical scene well. Passed shortly after the 
birth of the new republic, 
[t]he whiskey tax was designed by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton to defray the cost to the federal government of its recent as-
sumption of the debts of the states. Most Kentuckians thought that 
they had already done their part in absorbing state debts by accepting 
depreciated currency and by purchasing Virginia treasury warrants for 
Kentucky lands, which were proving to be worth little more than the 
paper they were written on. They strongly objected to paying taxes to 
a government that seemed uninterested in solving either of their most 
pressing problems: protecting them from the Indians or securing the 
free navigation of the Mississippi from the Spanish. Moreover, a tax 
on domestic distilled spirits appeared to them to be discriminatory be-
cause it did not fall equally on all parts of the country. It seemed un-
fair because whiskey was often the only common medium of exchange 
in the West, where specie was rare. And it seemed oppressive because 
it taxed their most valuable export. [P. 98.] 
And so Kentucky resisted, not as violently as Pennsylvania, where 
federal troops were needed to suppress the famed Whiskey Rebel-
lion, but nevertheless boldly and stubbornly. Kentuckians could re-
sist without violence because they had acquired a powerful ally: the 
law as espoused by the federal district court. The legal challenge to 
the internal revenue laws employed evasive devices to ensure that 
the tax remained uncollectible. 
Tachau richly details the federal government's attempts to en-
force the whiskey tax. Her examination of conflicting legal and 
political strategies and her analysis of the intermittently arrogant 
and occasionally incompetent Federalist enforcement attempts is 
often perceptive, but her major effort is to tie together two significant 
historical ideas: first, the utilization of rigorous English common-
law procedural technicalities and standards, and second, the surpris-
ingly good local reputation of the Kentucky federal court. She over-
looked, however, the most important and illuminating aspect of her 
findings, and in the process created, I think totally unconsciously, an 
historical illusion. 
What Tachau has unwittingly uncovered is that Judge Innes's 
March 1981) History of Lower Federal Courts 647 
handling of the whiskey tax prosecutions in Kentucky was a classic 
example of the manipulation of the rule oflaw. Judge Innes, a polit-
ical ally of Jefferson, was systematically making it difficult, if not 
impossible, for any Federalist prosecutor to win convictions under 
the terms of an act promulgated by a Federalist Congress. By inter-
posing the strict procedural standards of British common law,. sup-
posedly antithetical to the Jeffersonian world view, Innes protected 
anti-Federalist defendants who asserted their local customary rights 
to produce whiskey. He apparently had little compunction in using 
the law of the King's Bench, so admired by the Federalists, to further 
his own Jeffersonian political principles. He thus managed to ham-
string the effective administration of Federalist law by using a favor-
ite Federalist device, English common law. 
What does Innes's behavior say about the rule of law as an effec-
tive jurisprudential concept in early post-Revolutionary America? 
Was the rule of law, as symbolized in this instance by strict English 
procedural standards, simply raised, as any legal tool, somewhat 
cynically to serve a political, and certainly not neutral, function? 
These questions are worth inquiring into, but Tachau is apparently 
either unaware of or uninterested in the recent significant literature 
on the rule of law1 to which her work might contribute. In ignoring 
these questions, unfortunately, she may have misperceived events. 
In her eyes, Innes quite naturally went about his business in bringing 
to the frontier the civilizing, neutral, dispassionate English jurispru-
dence that legitimated his judging. I suspect Judge Innes was 
smarter than that. If in fact, as Tachau contends, Kentuckians 
respected their federal court because it enforced the rigorous techni-
calities of English law, it seems unlikely that they did so out of devo-
tion to English jurisprudence. Such faith would seem almost 
counterintuitive. What seems more likely is that Kentuckians 
respected Judge Innes because he was willing to use law, from 
whatever source, to reach appropriate political results. Law, there-
fore, was used to further politics. Kentuckians appreciated English 
procedure not for its neutrality, but for the services that it could per-
form in the guise of neutrality. 
E.P. Thompson has written of early eighteenth-century England's 
Black Act that the rule of law 
l. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 25-49 (1974); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS 
AND HUNTERS 258-69 (1975); Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S 
FATAL TREE 17-63 (1975); F. NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Soci-
elj', in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 39-43 (1957); Horwitz, Book Re-
view, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977). 
648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:645 
could not be reserved for the exclusive use only of . . [a particular 
social] class. The law, in its forms and traditions, entailed principles of 
equity and universality which, perforce, had to be extended to all sorts 
and degrees of men. And since this was of necessity so, ideology could 
tum necessity to advantage. What had been devised by men of prop-
erty as a defense against arbitrary power could be turned into service 
as an apologia for property in the face of the propertyless. And the 
apologia was serviceable up to a point: for these "propertyless," as we 
have seen, comprised multitudes of men and women who themselves 
enjoyed, in fact, petty property rights or agrarian use-rights whose defi-
nition was inconceivable without the forms oflaw. Hence the ideology 
of the great struck root in a soil, however shallow, of actuality. And 
the courts gave substance to the ideology by the scrupulous care with 
which, on occasion, they adjudged petty rights, and, on all occasions, 
preserved proprieties and forms.2 
Thompson's insights seem particularly applicable to Judge Innes's 
response to the whiskey tax. By applying English procedural stan-
dards - in manipulating the rule of law - Judge Innes nullified 
positive law and in effect reaffirmed customary law. The rule of law 
thus apparently preserved the integrity of certain neutral and unas-
sailable legal principles. But there may have been a hidden cost. 
Though from the perspective of Kentucky whiskey distillers an ap-
propriate and justifiable outcome was reached, the hidden message 
was that the rule of law could just as easily be used, in different 
hands, to suppress conduct that most would recognize as legitimate. 
The rule of law can only pretend to be neutral. Judge Innes intui-
tively understood that, conveniently situated, it could be used to jus-
tify the elevation of one set of political principles over another only 
as long as the appearance of neutrality was maintained. In the face 
of diametrically opposed political views, the rule of law cannot guar-
antee that the appearance of evenhandedness and neutrality will 
avoid conflict. This is an underlying theme of some interest and im-
portance in Kermit Hall's book. 
Hall has written a very able book describing the politics of the 
2. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 264. In the concluding portion of his book, Thompson 
is concerned with the complex relationship between the rule of law and class relations, and in 
particular the extent to which law mediated class relations. In reviewing Tachau's book, I 
cannot directly address Thompson's theoretical revisions of traditional Marxist thought. First, 
I do not know anything about class relations in Kentucky circa 1800, and second, Tachau's 
book, one of the few sources available to me on the subject, does not tell me anything useful. 
All that appears from the litigation, an extremely risky source from which to generalize, is that 
the people against whom the federal government sought to enforce the federal law seemed lo 
be either individuals relatively isolated from the central government seeking to maintain their 
customary rights or Jeffersonian political partisans of some prominence. (The tax collectors, of 
course, were Federalists.) Standing alone, this record does not prove that class conflict existed. 
I am far more interested, though, in the theoretical implications of Thompson's broader point 
about the rule of law as rule of law, pure and simple. 
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selection process for federal district court and territorial court judges 
from the presidencies of Andrew Jackson to James Buchanan - the 
period of the second party system.3 Hall argues that "the distribu-
tion of political influence through the judicial patronage during the 
era of the second party system can be viewed in the context of polit-
ical modernization" (p. xv). To determine whether lower federal 
court judicial selection is an example of "political modernization," 
Hall focused on two criteria: first, "the extent to which the progress 
became institutionalized," and second, "the degree to which a func-
tional elite replaced a traditional elite" (p. xv). Institutionalized ju-
dicial selection "tends to become formal, impersonal, automatic, and 
bureaucratic" (p. xv), almost Weberian, as it becomes more modem, 
and as a result "nominees for appointment to public office are usu-
ally selected on the basis of special training and experience" (p. xv), 
and become somehow "functional." The movement, then, is away 
from "traditional" expressions of political behavior, such as the se-
lection of judges through "an informal hierarchy of kinship and 
friendship relations" (p. xv), which was supposedly symptomatic of 
presidential lower federal court appointments in the first American 
party system dominated by Federalists and ·Jeffersonians. The vehi-
cle with which the transformation was accomplished, according to -lit 
Hall, was the disciplining force of party politics as practiced by 
Whigs and Democrats. Parties rationalized what was once left to 
traditional kinship and friendship ties. The role of parties can best 
be appreciated by tracing the interaction of two constraints: those 
that emerged from members of the political party in control, in this 
case, the gradual rise of an early form of senatorial courtesy, and 
those that emerged from the "executive branch's internal organiza-
tion" (p. xvii), in this case the allocation of the president's control of 
the political patronage process for judicial selection. 
In enormous, almost numbing, detail, Hall takes us through a 
painstaking re-creation of the judicial selection process in a great 
number of appointments in every presidential administration from 
1829 to 1861. (I never thought, for instance, that in order to pay my 
dues as a legal historian, I would be required to read twenty pages 
on the lower federal court appointments of Millard Fillmore.) Along 
3. Hall captures the current historiographical characterization of the second party system: 
[S]o called to distinguish it from earlier party competition between Federalists and Jeffer-
sonians, [it] began with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and ended with the elec-
tion of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. The second party system was the product of a 
distinctive political culture in which popular participation and partisanship replaced so-
cial deference and disdain of party. 
P. xiii (footnote omitted). 
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the way, we are treated to mostly pithy, sometimes cryptic, and occa-
sionally perceptive descriptions of the internal dynamics of the vari-
ous appointments. Hall describes who was proposing whom, where 
the proposers, opposers, and prospective nominees stood within the 
various factions in the state parties (there were many factions -
Whigs and Democrats were hardly monolithic), where the same clus-
ters stood in light of the distribution of power in the House and the 
Senate, and what the aspirations of the various presidents were as 
they created and then attempted to enforce standards in the appoint-
ments process. 
, Hall shows a fine command of both the different political sit-
uations and the general tendencies and trends. A number of in-
stitutional developments did occur - interested senators and 
congressmen tended to assert greater control over time, stepping into 
the increasing power void created by undisciplined, squabbling, 
party organizations and weak presidents without natural constituen-
cies. Eventually responsibility for screening and managing judicial 
patronage appointments was transferred from an overburdened Sec-
retary of State to a less burdened and seemingly more qualified At-
torney General. Not surprisingly, however, traditional kinship and 
friendship ties lingered to a degree despite the increasingly "mod-
em" institutionalization of appointment criteria, as appointment 
"mediators" continued to emphasize that these ties could cement 
political alliances. 
Whether all of this is more "modem" in comparison with other 
historical stages or periods is not an issue on which I have a position. 
What does strike me as interesting is another theme illustrated by the 
pattern of appointments - a pattern that emerged as the Civil War 
approached. Sectionalism and slavery dominated the debates about, 
and the perceptions of the prospective appointees.4 Particularly as 
4. In addition to analyzing the political considerations that led to appointments, Hall also 
includes a substantial amount of very valuable prosopographical data on all the lower court 
federal judges appointed during this period. In the process, a kind of input-output problem is 
raised. Hall organizes his material in two ways: internally, comparing both district court to 
territorial court appointees, and Whig to Democratic presidential appointees; and externally, 
comparing the post-1829 appointees to those of the pre-1829 period. (One problem is that the 
book fails to make the comparison to the pre-1829 group on the basis of the judicial selection 
process itself. We are, more or less, left assuming it was different.) Hall quantifies a good deal 
of social historical material - social origins, social standing, education, age, and political ac-
tivism. It turns out that on the social status side of the equation, there were few internal or 
external differences. Both Whigs and Democrats appointed judges largely from the same 
"elite or prominent" social class, and ignored those candidates who had only "modest" roots. 
And the differences between pre-1829 appointments and post-Jacksonian appointments is sta-
tistically quite small. In short, judges generally came from the same social "class," as difficult 
as that term is to define, from the Revolution to the Civil War. This fact raises several interest-
ing questions. Not the least of these is how the similarity in class origin (one form of input) 
March 1981) History of Lower Federal Courts 651 
Democrats Pierce and Buchanan grappled with the dual legacy of 
the Mexican War- expansionism and slavery- and attempted to 
forestall "the impending crisis," a curious kind of compromise devel-
oped. The compromise was based on the perceived need, on the eve 
of the disintegration of the Union, to appoint judges, in both the 
North and South, who understood the necessity of imposing the rule 
of law on the threatened chaos. 
The compromise was affected with an eye toward finding a solu-
tion to the moral problem of slavery. The rise of the Republican 
party in the 1850s was built on the failure of Democrats and Whigs 
to confront successfully the moral failings of the state. The legal ne-
cessity of preserving the Union "added political fervor to the notion 
that in a society paradoxically committed to slavery and human free-
dom, moral obligation derived from the individual's rather than the 
state's understanding of the law" (p. 130). "Sectional harmony" 
(p. 149) became the preferred solution. The search for "harmony" 
intruded itself into the judicial selection process as well as other as-
pects of national life since judges were likely to have to make impor-
tant decisions affecting various aspects of slavery under the 
Constitution.5 Therefore, it was important to appoint judges who 
had the true interests of the Union at heart. Judicial appointments 
were made to capitalize on and exploit "the image of a disinterested 
judiciary" in order to promote "sectional harmony" (p. 149). In the-
ory, the implementation of this program was easy. As long as one 
could find "qualified" judges, politically qualified of course, one 
could insure success. Federal district judges "in the free states would 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law; their slave-state counterparts would 
supervise prosecutions of violators of the neutrality and slave trade 
laws" (p. 149). The commitment to the equal enforcement of the 
affected the evolutionary pattern of private-law legal doctrine (the output). Obviously the 
problem of grappling with enough variables to get an effective model for evaluating judicial 
behavior is incredibly complex. But it is an intriguing thought, given that we know so little 
about these early judges, that social class may be an important factor in determining ideology. 
Obviously social class does not necessarily determine ideology. There can be vast ideological 
differences within a social class. But it does appear that lower court federal judges were for a 
long time socially homogeneous. The similarities may warrant further inquiry. 
5. It does not appear from Hall's study whether the judges appointed in the last decade or 
so before the Civil War had any substantial impact on the legal issues surrounding slavery. 
Hall makes no attempt to evaluate doctrinal output based on or matched to the political crite-
ria isolated in the appointments process. He follows, for instance, no individual judicial ca-
reers. Though beyond the parameters of Hall's study, such an evaluation would have proved 
useful in measuring, even in Hall's terms, the effectiveness of the modem, party-directed ap-
pointment trend. Finally, for a useful study of how courts dealt with the legal aspects of slav-
ery, see P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION (1981). 
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law, North and South, free and slave, was designed to defuse the 
potential conflict between moral principles. 
This strategy failed. As Hall points out: 
Equal federal enforcement of the laws did not mean equal justice. The 
legal perpetuation of slavery compromised the legal institutions of the 
nation to such a degree that the doctrine of judicial impartiality came 
to be seen as a violation of the moral imperatives of the more radical 
element of the Republican party. [P. 149.] 
In a sense, then, the Civil War became a crisis of law and order 
because law could not carry the burden of moral violation. The rule 
of law, appearing neutral, assumed totally artificial importance - a 
mere symbol powerless to prevent the oncoming confrontation. The 
legal idea of constitutional union could not incorporate the moral 
conception of freedom. What appeared neutral and unassailable -
the equal enforcement of the law - could not disarm the moral as-
sault on the law's integrity. What reliance on the rule of law had 
established was that equality does not necessarily mean freedom. 
The attempt to use law to suppress the moral dilemma ultimately 
failed, and with it, the right of law to command our unqualified re-
spect. 
Though the reasons for the failures of the past may eventually 
become clear, it is not altogether obvious how they might aid us in 
arriving at what our present alternative visions, hopes, or social theo-
ries ought to be. It is not even apparent that we consistently under-
stand what we ought to avoid. What Tachau and Hall have done is 
to give us more grist, in very fine historical detail, for the mill. 
